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1. Overview  
Lack of compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), which can result in unlawful deaths, 
destruction and impediments to humanitarian relief operations, is a tremendous humanitarian 
challenge (Akande and Gillard, 2017; Kremte, 2017; Pejic, 2016). In order to achieve the main goal 
of IHL - to protect persons affected by violence and minimise human suffering – the mere existence 
of law is not sufficient. It must be coupled with a strong compliance system (Kremte, 2017). 
Compliance requires a multifaceted effort involving a range of activities by a diverse group of 
actors. They include prevention activities, such as the adoption of domestic legislation 
implementing IHL treaty obligations, training of armed forces and appointment of legal advisers to 
the armed forces, and teaching and dissemination of IHL to the general public (Kremte, 2017). 
They also include ‘naming and shaming’ violators; and mechanisms and procedures for 
determining individual criminal responsibility for alleged violations of IHL, such as the creation of 
international or hybrid courts and tribunals or proceedings before domestic courts (Pejic, 2016). 
This rapid literature review reveals a significant gap in evidence on the cost-efficiency of efforts to 
promote compliance with international humanitarian law. This has yet to be an area of research. 
The only relevant studies that could be found focus on the cost-efficiency of international criminal 
justice, comparing the costs of international courts, hybrid courts, and domestic courts. While 
international criminal tribunals are considered to be more costly overall, this is due to their greater 
complexity. They are not more costly than the most similar domestic trials or hybrid trials when 
evaluated on a per-day basis. This is considered to be a better way to measure cost-effectiveness. 
The effectiveness of international criminal law (ICL) also depends on whether it fulfils the various 
aims of ICL (e.g. justice for victims, accountability, deterrence, reconciliation). 
Given the lack of research on cost-effectiveness of other initiatives related to IHL compliance, their 
general effectiveness is explored in this helpdesk report. Research on dissemination of IHL, such 
as educational programmes and training for the military and civilians reveal an overall increase in 
scholarship on IHL, in terms of educational tools, research, publications and outreach. This has 
the potential to impact on compliance should those receiving education and training end up in 
positions of authority and decision-making. Research in this area does not examine issues of cost-
effectiveness, however. It is also challenging to determine general effectiveness, due to difficulties 
with attribution (e.g. whether a course on IHL in peace-time prevents violations of IHL during war-
time). Research on monitoring and exposure of IHL violations also have the potential to contribute 
to the promotion of compliance with IHL. Deeds of Commitment, a monitoring and verification 
mechanism directed at armed non-state actors, for example, can be effective in ensuring improved 
compliance with IHL. Advancements in social media can allow for more widespread and rapid 
monitoring and exposure of violations and abuses. In addition, national IHL committees can help 
in promoting dissemination of IHL and monitoring of violations of and compliance with IHL. The 
integration of these committees in high levels of government can contribute to greater promotion 
of and compliance with IHL. Studies on ‘naming and shaming’ violators of IHL find that in some 
cases, this strategy can be linked to improvements in compliance with IHL and human rights 
practice. Sanctions may be implemented alongside ‘naming and shaming’, however the need to 
monitor sanctions can make it a costly IHL initiative.    
2. Methodology 
This rapid literature review is based on 5 days of desk research on cost-effectiveness of efforts to 
promote international humanitarian law. The ALNAP Humanitarian Evaluation, Learning and 
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Performance (HELP) database and Google Scholar were used as primary sources for material to 
review. The review aims to examine efficiency and effectiveness of the promotion of international 
humanitarian law, and materials that discuss either or both of these aspects have been included.  
The ALNAP database was searched with the keyword “cost-effectiveness” and tag “international 
law”, and the search returned 156 results. A scan of the titles and a survey of potentially relevant 
documents, conducting a find of all “cost” and “effective” words, separately, did not yield any 
relevant documents. In these documents, “cost” often referred to the human cost of war, to 
hypothetical costs, or other aspects not related to cost-efficiency of IHL initiatives. “Effective” often 
referred to the effectiveness of IHL in general or other legal frameworks, “effective control” in war, 
or effectiveness of other humanitarian work, rather than effectiveness of initiatives designed to 
promote compliance with international humanitarian law. Another search of the ALNAP database 
was conducted with the keywords “cost-effectiveness” and “international humanitarian law”, 
without the tag “international law”. This yielded 385 results, but, similarly, did not produce any 
relevant documents. Subsequent scans of the database entailed searching for the words “cost-
effectiveness” along with specific initiatives, e.g.: “international criminal law” (18 results); “criminal 
trials” (7 results); education promoting IHL (152 results); and “naming and shaming” (26 results). 
This also did not produce any relevant documents. 
A further search was conducted within Google Scholar using the keywords “cost-effectiveness” 
and “international humanitarian law” with a start date of 01/01/2011. This produced 458 results. A 
review of the first 100 results revealed that this search criteria is broad, producing documents with 
information too general to be of use to this specific query. Subsequent searches included: “cost-
effectiveness” “international humanitarian law” promotion compliance; along with searches 
involving the specific initiatives: ICL, “criminal trials”, “education”, “naming and shaming”. These 
searches uncovered some relevant documents, relating specifically to the cost effectiveness of 
international criminal justice (4 studies). Where documents appeared relevant, ‘related articles’ 
and ‘cited by’ articles were also examined.  
Given the dearth of studies on costs and cost-effectiveness of initiatives designed to promote 
international humanitarian law, literature on the general effectiveness of such initiatives on the 
humanitarian impact of conflict have been included.  
3. International criminal law 
There are currently no dedicated judicial or quasi-judicial bodies to address violations of 
international humanitarian law (Pejic, 2016). International criminal tribunals are, however, 
considered by some to be an important mechanism in promoting compliance with international 
humanitarian law (see Jenks and Acquaviva, 2014). The expectation is that the enforcement of 
international criminal justice can deter crime, with the threat of punishment, and strengthen future 
compliance with IHL (Brammertz, 2015). Some argue that this deterrent effect is questionable as 
the behaviour of military commanders and soldiers are unlikely to be influenced by complicated 
and often prolonged judicial proceedings (see Jenks in Jenks and Acquaviva, 2014). This is due 
to them not reading judgments, not understanding them if they have read it, or not recognising how 
to translate it into meaningful decisions. Judgments are generally not tailored to address military 
advisors as audience members (see Jenks in Jenks and Acquaviva, 2014). Acquaviva (in Jenks 
and Acquaviva, 2014) argues that general deterrence may not be the best lens through which to 
consider the role of international criminal justice in affecting IHL compliance.  Rather, the 
development of a comprehensive system of accountability, through a growing number of 
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international criminal judgements, is considered by military commanders. It is reported, for 
example, that ICC investigations into possible crimes in Afghanistan made US military lawyers 
attempt to match up incidents of interest to the Court with various investigations conducted 
internally by the US military (Acquaviva in Jenks and Acquaviva, 2014).  
Cost-effectiveness 
Alongside measuring an organisation’s effectiveness in achieving particular goals, such as justice 
for victims, accountability, deterrence and societal reconciliation, attempts have also been made 
to determine the cost-effectiveness of international criminal trials (Shany, 2012). Analysis of 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness of international criminal justice can facilitate not only discussion 
of judicial performance and outcomes, but also justifications for the very existence of international 
courts (Shany, 2012). An organisation may be effective in terms of fulfilling particular goals but still 
be inefficient in terms of generating considerable costs (Shany, 2012). 
The completion strategy leading to the closure of the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) appears to have been motivated in part by a 
perception that the Tribunals’ continued operation had become too expensive to be justified by 
their diminishing returns (Shany, 2012). Questions are raised as to whether the resources invested 
in establishing and maintaining an international court are providing value for money or whether 
they could have been directed toward alternative projects (e.g. non-judicial mechanisms) (Shany, 
2012). 
Ford (2011, 960-961) reports that hybrid tribunals cost significantly less than ad-hoc and 
permanent international courts.  Up until 2015, spending was expected to be dominated by the 
ICTY, ICTR and ICC, with the two hybrid tribunals – the SCSL and the Extraordinary Chambers in 
the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) – collectively costing less than 10 per cent of the total. Studies 
below find, however, that cost-efficiency can be better measured through per-day assessments. 
Wippman (2006): In order to assess the cost-effectiveness of international criminal trials, Wippman 
compares the cost of such trials to the cost of criminal trials in an effective national legal system.  
His statistical analysis finds that per-trial day costs of the ICTY do not differ dramatically from those 
of national legal systems. Rather, the high costs of the ICTY proceedings stem primarily from the 
greater length and complexity of international criminal trials and the need for international 
cooperation. Whether international criminal trials are providing value for money depends on the 
extent to which one believes that the trials are achieving its goals. 
Ford (2014): This study surveys publicly reported data on the budgets of the courts (from annual 
reports, completion strategies, General Assembly resolutions, reports from the Secretary-General, 
decisions of budgeting committees) in order to determine the amount of money spent on 
international criminal courts. It can be challenging, however, as documents are often hard to find. 
In addition, documents can be difficult to interpret and compare across courts as they do not all 
report the same information in the same way or for the same periods. In order to determine the 
cost-effectiveness of the ICTY, Ford develops a quantitative measure of complexity, which can 
apply across international and domestic court systems, and measures efficiency based on the ratio 
of trial complexity to cost. He finds that the ICTY’s trials have been efficient given their complexity. 
He also finds that the court is more efficient than the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). This 
is despite the fact that the SCSL was specifically designed to be more efficient than the ICTY. The 
SCSL was cheaper overall than the ICTY, only because the court tried fewer cases, not due to 
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greater efficiency. Ford also finds that the ICTY is more efficient than its closest domestic 
comparator – mass atrocity trials. 
Jalloh and Morgan (2015): This study seeks to assess the role of the ICTR and the SCSL and their 
normative impact on local communities.  In terms of cost-effectiveness, it finds that the ICTR did 
not cost substantially more on a per-day basis than federal criminal trials in the United States. 
However, as international criminal trials last considerably longer than the average criminal trial, 
their cost per trial is far greater than the average domestic proceeding. The study also finds that 
the lower overall costs of the SCSL are not due to its efficiency, as the per-defendant costs are 
substantially the same for either court.  
4. Dissemination: education and training 
The obligation to disseminate international humanitarian law and to integrate it into military 
instruction and training is based on the assumption that spreading awareness of IHL among all 
citizens can prevent unlawful conduct by soldiers (Bates, 2014). Fleck (2006) asserts that 
education and training in IHL should not be limited to the armed forces and the personnel of 
organisations providing humanitarian assistance. Rather, civil society as a whole should be 
engaged, with IHL education available in schools and universities. IHL knowledge should also be 
imparted to decision-makers in order to help ensure that IHL considerations are taken into account 
(Rosenzweig, 2014). 
The effects of dissemination – education and training - can be difficult to prove, to quantify or 
measure (Brissal, 2015; see Lamp, 2011 and Ratner, 2011 in Krieger, 2013). It is difficult, for 
example, to determine how a lecture to a group of students on IHL, during peacetime, can help 
prevent violations of the laws of war (Brissal, 2015). 
Education 
Jastram and Quintin (2014): This study, based on a lengthy online survey completed by eighty-
seven law school professors in the United States, follow-up interviews, and data collection of law 
school courses and legal resources (books, articles, working papers), provides a comprehensive 
review on the state of IHL teaching and scholarship in US legal academia. It finds a high level of 
growth in IHL scholarship and increased opportunities for student engagement and professional 
development. 
McCormarck (2014): This paper assesses the Australian Red Cross IHL programme, which 
involved the establishment of a Chair of IHL at the Melbourne Law School. Based on the author’s 
personal experience, the paper finds that the collaboration between the Red Cross and the 
university has contributed to a greater emphasis on IHL education in Australia. There are more 
schools teaching IHL, higher levels of research in IHL, and more outreach to militaries of the South-
East Asia and South Pacific region. 
Law competition 
The Association for the Promotion of International Humanitarian Law (ALMA) engages in various 
initiatives to promote compliance in IHL, including a national IHL competition involving students 
from nine major Israeli academic institutions. While it is difficult to analyse direct and indirect 
impacts of this initiative over time, Rosenzweig (2014) finds in an unofficial check with alumni that 
among graduates who took part in the competition, at least five work for the government Ministry 
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of Affairs, six are involved with IHL and human rights NGOs, and several others are serving as 
officers in the IDF Military. The paper also finds that the main tool for limiting costs is relying on 
cooperation with different institutions. 
Training 
Parties to the Geneva Conventions are obligated to provide training in IHL, in order to foster lawful 
and effective military operations and to protect civilians and all persons in zones of conflict (Blank 
and Kaye, 2014). Regular armed forces and armed opposition groups need to include international 
humanitarian law in their operational training (Fleck, 2006). Greater respect for IHL is possible only 
with such training and with strict orders as to appropriate conduct and the application of effective 
sanctions in the event of non-compliance (Rojas and Frésard, 2004).   
IHL training does not, however, necessarily lead to compliance with IHL (Bates, 2014). There is a 
gap between the knowledge combatants have of humanitarian norms and their inclination to 
respect them during hostilities (Rojas and Frésard, 2004). While some argue that training seminars 
provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others do not have the 
desired effect, in terms of changes in behaviour, others emphasise that improvement in compliance 
due to the ICRC’s involvement may be indirect and belated (see Krieger, 2013).  
The ICRC has moved beyond solely training in legal norms to an ‘integration’ approach. It involves 
a continuous process in which IHL becomes relevant to ‘doctrine, training, education, equipment 
and sanctions’. Such an ongoing process would allow, for example, for IHL training to be conducted 
with an understanding of military discipline; and for soldiers and officers to learn about new 
weapons system in the context of IHL norms and rules (Bates, 2014). This could in turn improve 
IHL compliance among service personnel (Bates, 2014). 
5. Monitoring and exposure 
Social media can serve as a useful conduit for tracking potential violations of IHL. The ability to 
receive information rapidly can lead to faster action to improve protection of civilians in armed 
conflict. Transmission of social media reports on IHL violations can also generate public 
mobilisation in support of intervention (Herzberg and Steinberg, 2012). Social media brought much 
attention to the 2011 violations of IHL in Libya, for example. This resulted in rapid response by the 
international community in the form of a UN Security Council Resolution 1970 condemning serious 
violations of IHL, an ICC investigation, and sanctions against the Gaddafi regime (Herzberg ad 
Steinberg, 2012). 
Deeds of Commitment, an innovative instrument developed by the NGO Geneva Call, is a 
monitoring and verification mechanism that addresses the conduct of armed non-state actors 
(ANSAs) (Bongard and Somer, 2011). A study on the strength of mechanisms to address the 
conduct of ANSAs finds that the Deed of Commitment on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines 
can be effective in ensuring improved compliance with at least some humanitarian norms (Bongard 
and Somer, 2011). The Deed comprises self-reporting, third party monitoring and field missions 
for verification of IHL violations. There are limitations, however, primarily a lack of sufficient 
resources to ensure systematic and prompt follow-up in monitoring and deployment of verification 
missions (Bongard and Somer, 2011).  
Social media has allowed for much swifter exposure of IHL violations to a large number of 
followers.  NGOs, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Médecins Sans Frontières 
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and Oxfam, are able to use their social media platforms to publicise their reports and campaigns, 
highlight violations, name and shame violators of IHL, generate activism and raise funds (Herzberg 
and Steinberg, 2012). Amnesty International, for example, often tweets to its more than 400,000 
followers about IHL, ranging from accounts of potential violations to efforts at international criminal 
prosecutions (Herzberg and Steinberg, 2012). While the ICRC also has a social media presence, 
it has not invested as much resources into the technology as other entities, and its use of social 
media in non-English formats is particularly limited (Herzberg and Steinberg, 2012). 
Mobile technology has also allowed for widespread and rapid reporting of violations by the general 
public. The UN Mission for Côte d’Ivoire, for example, established an SMS hotline for reporting 
violations and other abuses. Material gathered was incorporated into reports that were used by the 
ICC Prosecutor to issue indictments (Herzberg and Steinberg, 2012). 
There are various limitations of using social media to conduct IHL compliance monitoring, such as: 
low internet penetration rates in many countries facing serious armed conflicts; and challenges 
with reliability and verification given the large volume of information (Herzberg and Steinberg, 
2012). 
6. National committees 
The ICRC assists states wishing to set up a national IHL committee and maintains regular contacts 
with existing committees. Descriptive studies on national IHL committees of Belgium, Peru and 
Mexico find that these committees have a role to play in creating an environment that favours the 
implementation of IHL and to help their respective states implement their IHL-related commitments 
(Pellandini, 2014). They have had a positive impact on the domestic implementation of IHL, its 
integration in domestic law and procedure, and promotion of IHL (Pellandini, 2014).  
The committees have also gained recognition for their IHL-related dissemination and training 
activities targeting key governmental sectors and groups within their respective societies; and for 
acquiring a recognised advisory function for their government. Success factors include: strong 
committee membership; incorporation of the committee into an important branch of government; 
and the establishment of working procedures, work plan and concrete activities (Pellandini, 2014). 
In Mexico, the dissemination activities and preparation of teaching materials of the Comisión 
Intersecretarial de Derecho Internacional Humanitario de México, Mexico's Interministerial 
Committee on International Humanitarian Law (CONADIH) has made it a reference organisation 
on IHL-related issues. It has also sensitised some decision-makers to take IHL into consideration 
when designing and promoting public policy. A key outcome of the strengthened relationship 
between CONADIH, other national authorities and IHL is the approval of the National Plan for 
Education in Fundamental Rights and Duties in 2014, which obliges different sectors to carry out 
training and education in IHL (Villon, 2014). 
7.  Naming and shaming 
Nyamutata (2013): As part of the protective framework to address the impact of armed conflict on 
children, the UN adopted a strategy of ‘naming and shaming’ government forces and rebel groups 
that violate IHL in relation to children. The assumption is that such public exposure will have a 
deterrent effect on named and shamed offenders. There is little analysis, however, into the impact 
of this policy. This study attempts to address this gap and assesses the UN’s naming and shaming 
practice since its inception in 2002, relying on UN annual statistics. It finds that there is not sufficient 
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evidence to demonstrate a causal link between naming and shaming and adherence to 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law, particularly among armed non-
state actors. 
Murdie and Davis (2012): This study also seeks to assess the relationship between naming and 
shaming and compliance with IHL and international human rights law, relying on a data set of 
shaming events of more than 400 human rights organisations (HROs) toward governments. It finds 
that while states targeted by human rights organisations often improve their human rights 
practices, mere shaming is not sufficient. Improvements stem from a combination of shaming by 
human rights organisations, a domestic presence of such organisations in the states in question 
and/or pressure by third-party states, individuals and governments. Thus, HROs can play an 
important role not only in pressuring the targeted state but also in encouraging third-party actors 
to pressure the states. 
Krain (2012): This study examines naming and shaming data in countries in which genocide or 
politicide is ongoing, adopting an ordered logit method for statistical analysis. It shows that the 
severity of ongoing genocide or politicide declines significantly after naming and shaming by 
NGOs, the media and international organisations. At a minimum, it takes away the excuse of 
policymakers that they did not know that atrocities and violations were occurring. 
Hafner-Burton (2008): This study, which examines the effects of campaigns on human rights 
practices of 145 countries between 1975-2000, finds that states’ political rights generally improve 
after being publicly shamed. In some cases, however, the statistics demonstrate that governments 
placed in the spotlight for abuses continue or even ramp up some violations subsequently.  
Sanctions 
Naming and shaming may at times be combined with particular sanctions. Krieger (2013) reports 
that although UN individually targeted sanctions appear not to be as efficient as anticipated, they 
can still generate a change in behaviour under certain conditions. These include, for example, 
cases in which they pursue a narrowly defined goal, such as turning over suspects; if they are 
immediately imposed as a consequence of violating an IHL rule; and if they are part of concerted 
actions involving different actors. In order to be effective, sanctions also require targeting of 
decision-makers and monitoring. The need for monitoring makes it relatively costly to rely 
exclusively on sanctions as a means of improving compliance with IHL (see Krieger, 2013). 
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